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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Donald Victor Baker appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Baker with trafficking in methamphetamine (Ada County 
Case No. CR-2010-19696); and methamphetamine possession with intent to 
deliver (Ada County Case No. CR-2010-14470). (R., pp.162-163. 1) The state 
also charged Baker with the persistent violator sentencing enhancement in both 
cases. (R., pp.162-163). Pursuant to plea agreement, Baker pied guilty to 
trafficking in methamphetamine, and the state agreed to dismiss the 
methamphetamine possession with intent to deliver charge and both sentencing 
enhancements. (Id.) Further pursuant to the agreement, the state was permitted 
to argue the facts of the dismissed charge at sentencing, and to seek restitution 
for lab and investigative costs associated with the dismissed charge. (Id.) The 
state also agreed to recommend no more than the three-year mandatory 
minimum fixed sentence for methamphetamine trafficking. (Id.) The district court 
imposed a unified 15-year sentence with three years fixed. (R., p.181.) Baker 
filed no direct appeal of his conviction or sentence. (See R., p.137.) 
In April 2012, Baker filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (R., 
pp.5-18.) ·He later filed an amended petition. (R., pp.136-160.) The district court 
1 See also Idaho Data Repository, Ada County Case Nos. CR-2010-14470; CR-
2010-19696. 
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denied Baker's motion for appointment of counsel and his various requests to 
conduct discovery. (R., pp.32, 121-122, 128) 
The court construed Baker's petition as containing the following claims 
and sub-claims: 1. His trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to investigate 
whether police officers could have identified him in the environmental conditions 
present at the time of his arrest; (b) failing to obtain information that the C.I. who 
conducted the controlled drug buy had a pending criminal charge and an 
agreement with the state regarding his participation in Baker's case; (c) failing to 
challenge certain testimony from the grand jury proceedings; (d) failing to file a 
motion to suppress; (e) failing to challenge the restitution award; (f) failing to 
utilize an entrapment defense; and (g) coercing him to plead guilty; (2) the state 
committed Brady2 violations by: (a) failing to disclose that the C.I. had a pending 
criminal charge against him and an agreement with the state to participate in 
Baker's case; (b) failing to disclose the original audio recording of the controlled 
buy and instead disclosing only a redacted version; and (c) failing to disclose that 
it had switched the high-end methamphetamine associated with Baker's case 
with cheaper low-grade methamphetamine shards, and then presenting the latter 
to the district court at the sentencing hearing;3 (3) the officers entrapped him; and 
(4) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order Baker to pay 
restitution in the dismissed case. (R., pp.273-283, 318-320.) 
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 
3 The district court did not reference this claim regarding the methamphetamine 
shards in its second notice of intent to dismiss, but did so in its dismissal order 
after Baker raised it in his response to the court's notice. (R., pp.293-296, 318-
319.) 
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After entering two separate notices of intent to dismiss (R., pp.203-213, 
273-283), the district court summarily dismissed Baker's petition (R., pp.318-
320). The court concluded that Baker failed to allege facts which, if true, would 
entitle him to relief as to any of his claims. (R., pp.273-283, 318-320, 323.) 
Baker appealed.4 (R., pp.301-304.) 
4 Baker appears to have filed a notice of appeal from a non-appealable order -
the district court's second notice of intent to dismiss the post-conviction petition. 
(R., pp.301-304); I.AR. 11. The Idaho Supreme Court conditionally dismissed 
the appeal (12/6/13 Order; 1/22/14 Order), but withdrew this dismissal and 
reinstated the appeal after the district court subsequently entered an appealable 
final order summarily dismissing Baker's post-conviction petition. (4/17/14 Order; 
R., pp.323.) Baker's premature notice of appeal was therefore perfected upon 
the subsequent entry of the district court's final judgment. See Weller v. State, 
145 Idaho 652, 654, 200 P.3d 1201, 1203 (Ct App. 2008). (Recognizing that 
while a strict interpretation of the appellate rules would render premature notices 
ineffective in such circumstances, the Idaho Supreme Court has frequently held 
otherwise and has exercised its discretion to consider the merits of such appeals. 
19.:. (citations omitted.) 
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ISSUES 
Baker's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as required 
by I.AR. 35(a)(4). 
The state phrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Baker failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition? 
2. Has Baker failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 





Baker Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Petition 
Introduction 
Baker contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition. (See generally Appellant's brief.) However, a review of 
the record reveals that Baker failed to allege facts which, if true, demonstrated he 
was entitled to relief as to any of his claims. Therefore, he cannot show that the 
district court erred. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings And 
Identification Of The Issues Raised In Baker's Appellant's Brief 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
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164 P.3d at 802; state v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal. of an application for 
post-conviction relief, in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative, if the applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case 
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the 
burden of proof." Berg v. state. 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998). 
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction 
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, deemed true. Cooperv. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,531 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(1975). However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Also, because the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact in the 
event of an evidentiary hearing, summary disposition is permissible, despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from the facts, for the court alone 
will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. State v. 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008). That is, the judge in a 
post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party 
opposing the motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the 
most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. kh 
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In this case, Baker's petition, amended petition, and appellant's brief are 
lengthy, repetitive, and difficult to decipher. Baker's Appellant's brief does not 
contain a statement of issues on appeal as required by I.AR. 35(a)(4). 
The affidavits and exhibits Baker submitted to the district court are sparse, 
vague, conclusory, and generally do not support the arguments he raises in his 
petition. (See R., pp.17-18, 136-160, 229-230, 235-245, 292-300.) Below and 
on appeal, Baker asserts that he hired a private law firm to investigate his post-
conviction claims, and that this firm compiled a "final report" supporting his 
claims. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-5, 21-22; R., p.219.) However, the record does 
not contain any such report. The only evidence relating to this private 
investigation contained in the record is a letter from the law firm apologizing to 
Baker that it could not be of significant assistance to him (R., pp.229-230), and 
documents that Baker purports to be related to a separate criminal case involving 
the C.I. who was involved in the controlled drug buy that led to Baker's arrest (R., 
pp.183-195). 
Further, on appeal, Baker does not assign any specific error to the district 
court, 5 but instead provides lengthy recitations of relevant law without applying it 
to his case, and largely repeats arguments submitted in support of his petition 
5 This Court may affirm the district court's summary dismissal of Baker's petition 
on the ground that he failed to assign specific error to the district court. It is well 
settled that the appellate court will not review actions of the district court for 
which no error has been assigned and will not otherwise search the record for 
errors. State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153, 159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983); see also 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (a party waives an 
issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking). 
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submitted below. (See generally Appellant's brief.) It is thus difficult both to 
identify the claims raised, and to thoroughly respond to each of them. 
The district court construed Baker's petition as containing four claims and 
numerous sub-claims as described above in the "Statement of Facts and Course 
of Proceedings." (R., pp.273-283, 318-320.) On appeal, Baker does not argue 
that the district court failed to address any of his claims in dismissing his petition, 
or that the state or the court mischaracterized any of his claims. (See generally 
Appellant's brief.) Thus, all of the claims potentially at issue before this Court are 
among those identified by the district court in its second notice of intent to 
dismiss and its dismissal order.6 Baker has not raised all of these claims in his 
Appellant's brief. Instead, the state liberally construes7 Baker's Appellant's brief 
as challenging the district court's summary dismissal of the following claims: (1) 
His trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to investigate whether officers could 
have identified him in the environmental conditions present at the time of his 
arrest; (b) failing to obtain information that the C. I. who conducted the controlled 
drug buy had a pending criminal charge and an agreement with the state 
regarding his participation in Baker's case; (c) failing to challenge the restitution 
6 Therefore, any claims that Baker attempts to raise on appeal that were not 
among those identified by the district court in_ either its second notice of intent to 
dismiss the petition, or in its dismissal order, are unpreserved, and may not be 
considered on appeal. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 
1062 (1991) (explaining that, generally, issues not raised below may not be 
considered for the first time on appeal). 
7 To the extent that this Court construes Baker's petition as containing any 
additional claims, the state relies on the analysis set forth the by the district court 
in summarily dismissing Baker's post-conviction petition. (See R., pp.203-213, 
273-283, 318'."319.) 
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award; and (d) coercing him into to pleading guilty; and (2) the state committed 
Brady violations by: (a) failing to disclose the original audio recording of the 
controlled buy and instead disclosing only a redacted version; and (b) failing to 
disclose that the C.I. had a pending criminal charge and an agreement with the 
state to participate in Baker's case. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Baker has 
failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of any of these 
claims. 
D. Baker Failed To Show He Was Entitled To Relief As To Any Of His 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by 
specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. 
An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable .... " Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but 
9 
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); 
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
1. The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That His Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Perform An Adequate 
Investigation 
Baker contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
adequately investigate his case prior to the entry of his guilty plea. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.14-16, R., pp.276-277.) Specifically, the district court construed Baker's 
petition as asserting that officers could not have identified him in the 
environmental conditions that were present at the time of his arrest, and that his 
attorney should have more adequately investigated this potential defense. (R., 
pp.276-277.) Baker's claim fails because it is conclusory and not adequately 
supported by admissible evidence. 
"[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any 
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure 
of deference to counsel's judgments." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. However, "the 
duty to investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off 
chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when 
they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste." Rompilla 
v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005). "When counsel focuses on some issues to 
the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he or she did so for 
10 
tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect." Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 
160, 164, 139 P.3d 762, 766 (Ct. App. 2006} (citing Yarborough v. Gentry. 540 
U.S. 1, 8 (2003}. 
In this case, as the district court properly concluded (R., pp.276-277), 
Baker failed to adequately support this claim with admissible evidence. In his 
amended post-conviction petition, Baker asserts that he enlisted a friend to take 
photographs at the site of his arrest from various distances, and that the friend 
reported to him that he was unable to identify a person in a vehicle from relatively 
short distances. (R., pp.147-148.) This hearsay, presented without appropriate 
context regarding what the police observed, is insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact with regard to this claim. 
Further, the state asserts that because Baker chose to plead guilty and 
accept a favorable plea agreement in which a felony charge and two sentencing 
enhancements were dismissed (R., pp.162-163), his attorney was not required to 
engage in as thorough an investigation to uncover potential factual defenses to 
the charge that he may have been had the case proceeded to jury trial. At the 
change of plea hearing, Baker testified that he understood he was waiving his 
right to require the state to prove the charges against him, that he was satisfied 
with his counsel's representation, and that there was not anything that he wanted 
his counsel to do that his counsel had not yet done. (R., pp.166-167.) This 
contradicts Baker's allegation that he asked his counsel to more closely 
investigate the credibility of the officers' identification of him. Baker's after-the-
11 
fact disagreements with his counsel's pre-trial investigative strategies do not 
demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective. 
Baker also failed to demonstrate prejudice from any deficiency. Baker has 
failed to allege facts demonstrating that the officers' initial visual identification of 
him during the controlled drug buy was so critical to the state's case that Baker 
would not have pied guilty had he been successful in casting doubt on that 
identification. (R., pp.177-178.) Though there was no jury trial to further develop 
the facts, it appears the state's case was based upon a phone call between the 
Baker and the C.I., and the subsequent controlled buy in the parking lot, both of 
which were recorded. (See R., pp.168-169.) 
Because Baker failed to allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to 
relief on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 
investigate the case, this Court should affirm the trial court's summary dismissal 
of this claim. 
2. The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That His Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Adequately Investigate The 
C.I. 
Baker contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain 
information that the C. I. who conducted the controlled buy with Baker had a 
pending criminal charge and an agreement with the state to participate in Baker's 
case. (Appellant's brief, pp.16, 23; R., p.277.) Baker's claim fails because it is 
conclusory and not adequately supported by admissible evidence. 
Baker has failed to provide context or specifics regarding his allegations. 
For example, Baker has failed to allege or present evidence that his trial counsel 
12 
was unaware of the C.l.'s pending criminal charge, that trial counsel's advice to 
Baker regarding whether to plead guilty would have been different had he known 
of the potential impeachment evidence, 8 or that Baker would have declined to 
accept the state's plea agreement if he had access to this information. 
Because he failed to assert facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief 
· on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 
investigate the C.I., this Court should affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of 
this claim. 
3. The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That His 
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Challenge The 
Restitution Award 
Baker contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 
the restitution award. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) Baker appears to assert that 
it was unlawful for the district court to order him to pay restitution associated with 
his dismissed charge. (See R., p.7, 224.) Baker's claim fails both because he 
failed to adequately support it with admissible evidence, and because it is belied 
by the record. 
As the district court recognized (R., p.278), the terms of the plea 
agreement permitted the state to seek restitution on the dismissed 
8 With respect to both Baker's ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims 
relating to the C.I., the state liberally infers that Baker asserts that evidence of the 
pending criminal charge against C.I. could have been used as impeachment 
evidence at trial. However, in his amended post-conviction petition and 
Appellant's brief, Baker's issue with the C.l.'s pending criminal charge appears to 
instead be that it violated the C.l.'s agreement with the Idaho State Police. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp.21-24; R., p.150.) Whether or not the C.I. breached any 
agreement with the Idaho State Police has no bearing on Baker's conviction or 
post-conviction claims._ 
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methamphetamine charge as a term of the plea agreement entered into by . 
Baker. (R., p.163.) Idaho law permits courts to, with the consent of the parties, 
order restitution even where the crime is not adjudicated or not before the court. 
I.C. § 19-5304(9). Further, Baker submitted no evidence supporting any 
allegation that the restitution amount awarded by the court was unreasonable, or 
that the awarded restitution amount would have been different had Blake's 
counsel challenged it. 
Because he failed to assert facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief 
on his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
restitution award, this Court should affirm the trial court's summary dismissal of 
this claim. 
4. The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That His 
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Coercing Him To Plead Guilty 
Baker contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for coercing him to 
plead guilty. (Appellant's brief, pp.7, 15, 18.) This claim fails because it is 
conclusory and not adequately supported by admissible evidence. 
Baker has failed to provide context or specifics regarding this claim. 
Baker submitted no evidence that any advice from his trial counsel to plead guilty 
was based upon ignorance of the law or any other objective deficiency. Further, 
as noted above, Baker entered into a favorable plea agreement in which a felony 
methamphetamine charge and two sentencing enhancements were dismissed. 
Baker has not demonstrated that the state's case against him was weak or that 
there were any other factors that rendered his counsel's advice with regard to the 
14 
plea agreement deficient. This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's 
summary dismissal of this claim. 
E. Baker Has Failed To Show He Was Entitled To Relief As To Either Of His 
Brady Claims 
Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defense all 
exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession. Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83 (1963). When there has been a conviction after trial, a Brady 
violation is found if the defendant can show: (1) that the evidence was 
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the state; 
and (3) materiality (i.e. prejudice). State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 380, 247 
P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). 
On a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, the test of prejudice is whether 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for the state's failure to produce the 
information, the defendant would not have entered the plea but would have 
insisted upon going to trial. Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415, 418, 162 P.3d 794, 
797 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 436, 885 P.2d 1144, 
1152 (Ct. App. 1994 ). In making this determination, the court will "employ an 
objective assessment, based in part on the persuasiveness of the withheld 
information as to whether the particular defendant and his counsel would have 
insisted on going to trial." Roeder, 144 Idaho at 418-419, 162 P.3d at 797-798. 
The court will not consider a defendant's subjective statements that he would not 
have pied guilty had he known of the information. & at 419, 162 P.3d at 798. 
The court must also consider any objective motivations a defendant may have 
15 
had for pleading guilty. Gardner, 126 Idaho at 436-437, 885 P.2d at 1152-1153. 
"Any benefit derived by the defendant from the guilty plea is a significant factor 
inasmuch as a plea may be heavily motivated by reduction of exposure to 
additional charges and criminal penalties." kl at 437, 885 P.2d at 1153 
1. The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That The State 
Failed To Disclose An Unredacted Version Of The Audio Recording 
Of The Controlled Buy 
Baker contends that the state committed a Brady violation by failing to 
disclose an unredacted version of the audio recording of the controlled buy, and 
by instead disclosing only a redacted version which "ended prematurely." 
(Appellant's brief, pp.22-23, 27; R., p.146.) Baker's claim fails because he has 
failed to support it with adequate admissible evidence. 
Baker's assertions that the state disclosed only a redacted version of the 
audio recording, and that the redacted material was exculpatory, is based upon 
an affidavit of Jason Whitaker. (R., pp.159-160.) In the affidavit, Whitaker 
asserted that he approached a vehicle in a Boise Shopko parking lot, presumably 
on the date and location of the controlled buy leading to Baker's arrest. (Id.) 
Whitaker asserted that he saw his roommate (whom Baker asserts was the C. I.), 
in the vehicle and wanted to "make sure everything was okay." (Id.) Whitaker 
then asserted that "[e]verything must [have] been okay because I don't 
remember anything." (Id.) These alleged facts are not sufficient to raise an issue 
of genuine issue of material fact with regard to this claim. 
First, Baker has not submitted evidence demonstrating that the state 
redacted the audio, or that any such redaction was unknown to Baker and/or his 
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trial counsel prior to his guilty plea. In any event, even assuming that the state 
redacted some kind of communication between Whitaker and Baker or the C.I. 
( or simply limited its disclosure to the relevant portion of the audio recording 
involving discussion of the drug buy), Baker has failed to allege or demonstrate 
that any such statement was exculpatory and material to his guilt or innocence. 
As noted above, Whitaker's affidavit contained no information regarding what he 
said or did not say when he encountered the C.I. Baker's allegations regarding 
this claim are entirely speculative. Therefore, Baker has failed to allege facts 
demonstrating that any information redacted from the audio was exculpatory, that 
the information was actually suppressed by the state, or that the information 
resulted in Baker pleading guilty rather than pursuing a jury trial. 
Finally, as the district court implicitly recognized (R., pp.279-281), Baker 
waived this claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal Generally, a post-
conviction petition is not a substitute for a direct appeal, and any issue which 
could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited. I.C. § 19-
4901 (b). Any alleged redaction in the audio recording disclosed by the state 
would or should have been apparent to Baker prior to entering his guilty plea, 
particularly since Baker was present when the controlled buy took place. He 
therefore could have raised this issue on direct appeal. 
Baker has failed to allege facts, which if true, indicate that he was entitled 
to relief on his Brady claim regarding the audio recording of the controlled buy. 
Baker has therefore failed to show that the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing this claim. 
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2. The District Court Properly Dismissed Baker's Claim That The State 
Failed To Disclose Criminal Record Of C.I. 
Baker contends that the state committed a Brady violation by failing to 
disclose that the C.I. who was involved in the controlled buy leading to Baker's 
arrest had a pending criminal charge and an agreement with the state to 
participate in Baker's case. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-24; R., pp.277.) Baker's 
argument fails because he has failed to allege facts which, if true, indicate he is 
entitled to relief on this claim. 
First, it is not clear from the record that Baker has alleged or presented 
evidence to support any proposition that the state failed to disclose the existence 
of any pending criminal charge against the C.I., or any agreement regarding that 
charge and the C.l.'s role in the controlled buy. Nor has Baker alleged or 
presented evidence demonstrating that he or his trial counsel were unaware of 
the C.l.'s pending criminal charge or agreement with the state at the time Baker 
entered his guilty plea. 
In any event, the state had no duty to disclose such information prior to 
Baker's guilty plea because it was merely potential impeachment evidence. 
"The United States Constitution does not require the State to disclose material 
impeachment information prior to entering a plea agreement with the defendant." 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 105 P.3d 376, 390 (2004) (emphasis added) 
(citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)). This is because 
impeachment evidence "is special in relation to the fairness of a trial not in 
respect to whether a plea is voluntary." Dunlap. 141 Idaho at 64, 106 P.3d at 390 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629); see also United States v. 
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Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Ruiz teaches that Brady does not 
protect against the possible prejudice that may ensue from the loss of an 
opportunity to plea..:bargain with complete knowledge of all relevant facts. This 
makes good sense: when a defendant chooses to admit his guilt, Brady concerns 
subside."). 
Impeachment evidence is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. 
to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. State v. Marsh, 
141 Idaho 862, 868-869, 119 P.3d 637, 643-644 (Ct. App. 2004). Exculpatory 
evidence relates to a defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 
772, 781, 984 P.2d 127, 136 (1997). 
In this case, any evidence regarding pending criminal charges against the 
C.I., or any agreement between the state and the C.I. regarding those charges 
and his participation in the controlled drug buy, was merely potentially 
impeaching, and not material to Baker's guilt or innocence as to the crime of 
trafficking in methamphetamine. The state therefore had no duty to disclose this 
information prior to Baker's guilty plea. 
Further, Baker has also failed to allege facts demonstrating that he would 
have chosen not to plead guilty had he access to such potential impeachment 
evidence about the C.I. The value of such evidence in this case would be limited 
because it would not be particularly surprising to a jury that a C.I. had a pending 
criminal drug charge against him, and had some agreement with the state to 
participate in a controlled buy. Therefore, even assuming both that the state had 
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some duty to disclose information about the C.I. prior to Baker's guilty plea, and 
that the state failed to do so, Baker cannot demonstrate prejudice. 
Baker has failed to allege facts, which if true, indicate that he was entitled 
\ 
to relief on his Brady claim regarding the C. I. 's pending criminal charges and 
agreement with the state. Baker has therefore failed to show that the district 
court erred in summarily dismissing this claim. 
II. 
Baker Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His 
Requests To Conduct Discovery 
A Introduction 
Baker contends that the district court erred by denying his various post-
conviction discovery requests. (Appellant's brief, pp.5, 13, 32.) Baker has failed 
to show that the district court abused his discretion because his discovery 
requests were premature, and because he cannot demonstrate that the 
requested discovery was necessary to protect his substantial rights. 
B. Standard of Review 
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter put to the 
sound discretion of the district court. I.C.R. 57(b); Raudebaugh v. State, 135 
Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001) (citing Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311, 
319, 912 P.2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 1996)). On review, the appellate court must 
determine whether the district court "acted within the boundaries of its discretion, 
consistent with any legal standards applicable to its specific choices, and whether 
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the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Lafferty. 125 
Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Baker's Discovery Request 
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) provides that, "the. provisions for discovery in 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply to the [post-conviction relief] 
proceedings unless and only to the extent ordered by the trial court." Idaho 
Criminal Rule 57(f) limits discovery to prevent the state and the court from being 
inundated with discovery requests by applicants who are either unaware of 
proper methods or are simply on fishing expeditions. The Idaho courts have 
recognized that traditional discovery methods, normally applicable to civil cases, 
might be inappropriate in collateral proceedings. Jacobsen v. State, 99 Idaho 45, 
50, 577 P.2d 24, 29 (1978); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 402, 973 P.2d 
749, 754 (Ct. App. 1999). In Raudebaugh, the Idaho Supreme Court explained, 
· "Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the 
district court is not required to order discovery." Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at 605, 
21 P.3d at 927. 
Further, "[i]n order to be granted discovery, a post-conviction applicant 
must identify the specific subject matter where discovery is requested and why 
discovery as to those matters is necessary to his or her application." State v. 
LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Ct. App. 2003), citing 
Aeschliman, 132 Idaho at 402-03, 973 P.2d at 754-55. 
In this case, Baker appears to assert that the district court erred by 
denying his discovery requests. (Appellant's brief, pp.5, 13, 32.) However, on 
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appeal, Baker does not identify any specific discovery request or argue why such 
discovery was necessary either to protect his substantial rights, or even to 
support his post-conviction claims. This Court may decline to consider this claim 
on this basis. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970. 
In any event, Baker has failed to demonstrate error. In the course of the 
post-conviction proceeding below, Baker requested: a transcript of the grand jury 
proceedings; the audio recording of the controlled buy; the audio recording of a 
debriefing between the C.I. and police; and interrogatories and depositions from 
his defense attorney, three Idaho State Police Officers, and an alleged witness to 
the underlying controlled buy. (R., pp.50-52, 123-127.) He also subpoenaed an 
Idaho State Police Detective to appear at court even though no evidentiary 
hearing had been scheduled. (R., p.104.) The district court denied these 
requests and quashed the subpoena. (R., pp.121-122, 128.) Baker has failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion. 
First, Baker's discovery requests were premature. The district court did 
not outright deny Baker's discovery requests, but instead stated that it would not 
grant them "at this point," during the I.C. § 19-4906 summary dismissal stage of 
the post-conviction proceeding. (R., p.128.) Other courts have similarly 
conducted the summary dismissal procedure in this manner and allowed 
petitioners to renew their request for discovery at a later date. See LePage, 138 
Idaho at 810, 69 P.3d at 1071; Aeschliman, 132 Idaho at 402-03, 973 P.2d at 
754-55. The district court had no obligation to grant discovery prior to its 
summary dismissal of Baker's petition. Had Baker alleged facts which, if true, 
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demonstrated he was entitled him to relief as to any of his claims, he would have 
had the opportunity to further pursue those claims in an evidentiary hearing. 
Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion because granting 
Baker's motion was not necessary to protect Baker's substantial rights. Baker 
does not adequately describe in the motion or on appeal how his substantive 
rights would be affected by the lack of discovery. The district court took judicial 
notice of the underlying criminal record (R., pp.45-47), and had full ability to 
evaluate whether Baker raised a genuine issue of material fact as to any of his 
claims. 
Baker has failed to show that his discovery requests were necessary, at 
the time he made them, to protect a substantial right. He has therefore failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion in denying these requests. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Baker's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 16th day of March, 2015 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of March, 2015, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Donald V. Baker 
IDOC #49484 
ISCI Unit 15/B181A 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
MWO/vr 
24 
MARK W. OLSON' 
Deputy Attorney General 
